Seniority Rules and the Gains from Union Organization

This paper examines the optimality of several seniority provisions which are common to U.S. union contracts. The paper focuses on the attempts by the initial union members to maximize their return from organizing the union. An overlapping generations model is used in the analysis. Seniority wage increases are found to serve as implicit initiation fees and thus serve as one means of appropriating rents from future union members. Layoff rules are shown to be optimal only when the organizers are constrained in the types of contracts they can write. Without these constraints, the optimal contract provides full insurance making layoff rules unnecessary. The paper concludes with a plausible set of constraints which organizers may face and discusses the conditions necessary for seniority layoff rules to result.

An Empirical Test of an Asymmetric Information Model of Strikes

Recent developments in the thoery of strategic bargaining demonstrate howinformational asymmetries can lead to prolonged and costly bargaining. These models can be applied to contract negotiations between unions and firms yielding an economic theory of strikes. To date, however, few empirical tests of these models have been carried out. This paper presents some evidence supporting this view of strikes. A set of predictions concerning the incidence and unconditional duration of strikes is derived from a simple bargaining model where the union is uncertain about the firm's future profitability. These predictions are then tested on a micro data set of major U.S. contract negotiations which took place from 1973 to 1977.

Orthonormal Polynomials on the Unit Circle and Spatially Discrete Painlev\'e II Equation

We consider the polynomials $\phi_n(z)= \kappa_n (z^n+ b_{n-1} z^{n-1}+ >...)$ orthonormal with respect to the weight $\exp(\sqrt{\lambda} (z+ 1/z)) dz/2 \pi i z$ on the unit circle in the complex plane. The leading coefficient $\kappa_n$ is found to satisfy a difference-differential (spatially discrete) equation which is further proved to approach a third order differential equation by double scaling. The third order differential equation is equivalent to the Painlev\'e II equation. The leading coefficient and second leading coefficient of $\phi_n(z)$ can be expressed asymptotically in terms of the Painlev\'e II function.Comment: 16 page

The Importance of Local Fiscal Conditions in Analyzing Local Labor Markets

A new test of the compensating wage differential model is proposed. The logic behind Roback's model showing how differences in nonproduced amenities may be reflected in intercity wage differentials is extended to the case of differences in local fiscal conditions, represented by tax rates and publicly produced services. Results show that differences in local tax rates and services provisions do generate compensating wage differentials across cities. The effects of a particularly large set of taxes and effective services output measures are examined.

On the Political Economy of Land Value Capitalization and Local Public Sector Rent-Seeking in a Tiebout Model

In this paper we examine the political economy. of capitalization in a Tiebout model when there is a rent-seeking public bureaucracy. A new approach is suggested for testing for the influence of successful local public sector rent-seeking on local property values. We present empirical evidence showing that property values are lower in cities which pay their public sector workers significantly more than similar public sector workers earn in other cities. Finally, we discuss how the regulatory process can be used to distribute rents arising from a short-run Tiebout disequilibrium to landowners, public sector workers, and renters.

Strikes and Holdouts in Wage Bargaining: Theory and Data

We develop a private-information model of union contract negotiations in which disputes signal a firm's willingness to pay. Previous models have assumed that all labor disputes take the form of a strike. Yet a prominent feature of U.S. collective bargaining is the holdout: negotiations often continue without a strike after the contract has expired. Production continues with workers paid according to the expired contract. We analyze the union's decision to strike or hold out and highlight its importance to strike activity. Strikes are more likely to occur after a drop in the real wage or a decline in unemployment.Bargaining; Signaling; U.S. Wage Negotiations

The Use of Replacement Workers in Union Contract Negotiations: The U.S. Experience, 1980-1989

It is argued in many circles that a structural change occurred in U.S. collective bargaining in the 1980s. Strike incidence declined, dispute incidence increased, and the composition of disputes shifted away from strikes and toward holdouts. We investigate the extent to which the hiring of replacement workers can account for these changes. For a sample of over 300 major strikes since 1980, we estimate the likelihood of replacements being hired. We find that the risk of replacement is lower for bargaining units with more experienced workers, and declines during tight labor markets. The composition of disputes shifts away from strikes as the predicted risk of replacement increases. In addition, the overall level of disputes increases as a result of the shift in the composition of disputes. Based on our estimates reducing the predicted replacement risk faced by bargaining units to the pre-1982 levels would have lead to a reduction in the dispute incidence by around 5 percentage points, an increase in the fraction of disputes involving a strike by around 4 percentage points, and an increase in the strike incidence by around 0.8 percentage points.Collective Bargaining; Strikes; Holdouts

Proofs of Two Conjectures Related to the Thermodynamic Bethe Ansatz

We prove that the solution to a pair of nonlinear integral equations arising in the thermodynamic Bethe Ansatz can be expressed in terms of the resolvent kernel of the linear integral operator with kernel exp(-u(theta)-u(theta'))/cosh[(1/2)(theta-theta')]Comment: 16 pages, LaTeX file, no figures. Revision has minor change

The Use of Replacement Workers in Union Contract Negotiations: The U.S. Experience, 1980-1989

It is argued in many circles that a structural change occurred in U.S. collective bargaining in the 1980s. We investigate the extent to which the hiring of replacement workers can account for this change. For a sample of over 300 major strikes since 1980, we estimate the likelihood of replacements being hired. We find that the risk of replacement declines during tight labor markets, and is lower for bargaining units with more experienced workers. We use the predicted replacement risk as an explanatory variable in a model of the union's choice between the strike and holdout threat. We find that strike usage decreases significantly as the predicted replacement risk increases. We estimate that a ban on the use of replacement workers would have increased strike incidence from 1982-1989 by 3 percentage points, a 30 percent increase.